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Disorderly Conduct Statutes And Ohio
D ISORDERLY CONDUCT WAS NOT AN OFFENSE AT COMMON LAW and
is prohibited only as provided by statute. In Ohio it can only be
defined in very general terms and normally consists of conduct which
annoys, inconveniences, or alarms other members of the community.
It may be, but is not necessarily, a breach of the peace. This Note
is concerned with the varied statutory definitions of the offense.
The vagueness of disorderly conduct statutes' has led a Municipal
Court judge in Baltimore, Maryland, to declare that "[j]udges who
have the daily responsibility of interpreting conduct and determining
whether it amounts to the crime of disorderly conduct have, because
of the vagueness of the definition, the added duty to be viligant
against abuse."2
In Ohio, as throughout the country, the peace and good order of
communities are often protected by vague disorderly conduct statutes
which fail to sufficiently define prohibited conduct. The failure of such
statutes to provide specific standards for enforcement, and the deter-
mination of the courts to uphold these laws, may lead to an arbitrary
standard of justice.
Whens the courts are presented with a vagueness question con-
cerning an archaic city or state statute, they should be eager to void,
rather than careful to limit and interpret the language of the law.
It is the duty of the legislatures to provide specific statutes which
benefit the individual and the community and it is the duty of the
courts to establish and insure the minimum standard of specificity
required of these statutes.
The Scope of the Problem
In 1971, an estimated 750,000 people were arrested in the United
States for disorderly conduct,3 and while this offense recorded the
second highest number of arrests for any such category,4 the nature
1 ANNO. CODE OF MARYLAND, art. 27 §123 (1957). This section ot the Maryland Code was
one of the disorderly conduct statutes to which Judge Watts referred. It provides in part:
"Every person who shall be found drunk, or acting in a disorderly manner to the distur.
bance of the public peace, upon any street or highway ---shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . .."
'Watts, Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV., 354,
355 (1967). The thrust of this article, adapted from a speech to the North American Judges
Association Eastern Regional Conference in 1967, is "that vith the changes in the attitude
of young people in our permissive society ... the courts must be alert to abuses and dis-
tortions in the law." As a result of vague disorderly conduct statutes, "[r]he judge has no
objective yardstick and is forced to rely on the opinion of the police officer. This . . . is a
dangerous set of circumstances which may lead to a lack of fundamental justice. The answer
would be to set forth in the statutes as completely and as broadly as possible those acts which
constitute offenses."
3 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 115 (1971).
41d.
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of the offense is such that the effect of these arrests is normally dis-
missed. As the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders rec-
ognized, however, the possibility of arbitrary arrest and prosecution
for even a minor criminal offense may inhibit expression and pro-
voke reactions from those within the minority community.' When
this possible source of hostility is measured against the estimated
750,000 arrests arising from disorderly conduct, the number of arrests
in this category takes on a more serious tone.
In 1967, the Kerner Commission found a need for specific legis-
lation which proscribed "the full range of riot behavior," rather than
to "rely on vague disorderly conduct or loitering statutes in riot situ-
ations."6 The law enforcement systems of our major cities, caught
unprepared in a wave of civil disorder, had used vague ordinances
to clear streets and punish conduct not otherwise prohibited.7 The
apparent "selective enforcement" of these ordinances was cited by
the Commission as one source of the minority unrest which led to
the explosive condition of America's ghettos.8 The legislative response
to this need varied, but in most jurisdictions we now find statutes
which prohibit specific riot behavior.9
In 1973, after the fear of civil disorder has declined, there re-
mains a problem with these vague disorderly conduct statutes as
they apply to the individual in less than full-blown riot situations.
The arbitrary enforcement of a statute may inhibit the only effective
method of expression many people have found. That is the right to
publicly disagree with the ideas and actions of others. It is a right
$NAiONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDEIS, REPORT 186 (1971), [herein-
after cited as Kerner Commission). Thi5 report was prepared by the Commission at the
request of President Lyndon B. Johnson to determine the cause of the civil disorders of 1967.
61d. at 26, 157. The Commission cited "abrasive relationships between police and . - .
minority groups . . . (as a) major source of grievance, tension, and ultimately, disorder."
7 Id. at 26.
aid.
5 See e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2923.51-.54 (Page 1972). These sections became
effective in 1968 to prohibit this specific riot behavior in Ohio. The first and second degree
riot statutes provide:
§2923.52 SECOND DEGREE RIOT.
No person shall participate with four or more others in violent and tumultuous
conduct:
(A) With intent to do a lawful act with unlawful force and violence in
such a manner as to create a clear and present danger to the safety of persons or
property;
(B) With intent to prevent or coerce official action, or to hinder, impede,
or obstruct a function of government;
(C) With intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a misdemeanor.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of riot in the second degree, and
shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
(Continued on next page)
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which must be jealously guarded and uniformly restricted for the
community good. That restriction must be limited and well defined.1
The Nature of the Problem
It is generally accepted that a statute prohibiting criminal con-
duct must strike a balance between the inherent first amendment
freedoms of the individual and the responsibility to protect the peace
and good order of the community.11 There are definite ascertainable
interests of the community which will support an exercise of police
power. 2 Carefully drawn statutes are necessary to protect these
interests from many forms of offensive conduct. For the sake of legis-
lative and administrative ease, however, the result is often a very
general statute which prohibits all annoying conduct.1 Suffering
from the constitutional infirmities of vagueness and overbreadth, the
statute may readily become a "weapon of oppression" infringing upon
the rights of the individual. 4
An example of such a vague and overbroad city ordinance, a
possible "weapon of oppression," can be found in the Code of Ordi-
nances for the City of Cincinnati:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to as-
semble, on any of the sidewalks, . . . and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,
or occupants of adjacent buildings . . .2
(Continued from preceding page)
,2923.53 FIRST DEGREE RIOT.
No person shall participate with four or more others in violent and tumultuous
conduct:
(A) With intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony;
(B) With intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any offense
involving force or violence against persons, whether such offense is a misdemeanor
or felony;
(C) When the actor or any participant to the knowledge of the actor uses
or intends to use a firearm or other deadly weapon, or dynamite or other danger-
ous explosive, or any incendiary device.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of riot in the first degree, and shall
be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both, or shall he imprisoned not less than one nor more than three years.
t0 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
11 American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
"Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App. 2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1968). "Ohio holds
that an exercise of police power will be held valid if it bears a real and substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and if it is not unreasonable or
arbitrary."
13 See e.g. SOUTH EUCLID, OHIO ORDINANCE 527.03 which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to disturb the peace and good order of the
city by fighting, quarreling, wrangling, threatening violence to the person or
property of others, or by riot, tumult, lascivious, obscene, profane, or scandalous
language, or by making outcries, clamor, or noise in the night, or by intoxication,
drunkenness . ..
"Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 US. 385 (1926).
Is CINCINNATI, OHIO, Con OF ORDINANCES §901-.6 (1956).
[Vol. 22:186
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The Kerner Commission cited the alleged arbitrary enforcement of
this ordinance as an inflammatory element in the 1967 civil disorders
which occurred in Cincinnati.1 Prior to a major disturbance, the
Negro community, resentful of an apparent double standard of justice
within the city, had presented a list of grievances to the municipal
government. 7 Included was a demand for the repeal of this anti-
loitering ordinance. Officials failed to realize the volatile frustrations
of people in the ghetto, however, and violence erupted. 18
When this ordinance was later contested in the courts, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the validity of this language and wrote that
"the word annoying is a widely used and well understood word; it is
not necessary to guess its meaning."19 Based on this interpretation,
the Court found that the ordinance was not vague.20 The Supreme
Court of the United States disagreed, however, and made a further
contribution to the definition of vagueness."1 It held the ordinance
vague because it subjected a first amendment freedom open to an
unascertainable standard, and overbroad because it could punish
"constitutionally protected conduct." 2 The ordinance, while properly
within the power of the city to regulate such conduct, did so in
terms from which no objective standard could be drawn. The word
"annoying," while capable of definition, provided only a subjective
standard for enforcement. What one man considers annoying con-
duct may not be annoying to another.23
It is the arbitrary enforcement of statutes based on such subjec-
tive standards which creates one basis for the vagueness doctrine. 4
The lack of specificity may lead to "arbitrary or capricious action"
by those charged with its enforcement."
Vagueness and Overbreadth
At common law," and now as an element of due process, 21 a
criminal statute must describe prohibited conduct with sufficient
" KERNER CoMMISsION, supra note 5, at 26.
T7 d. at 26, 27.
7 Id. "Between January of 1966, and June of 1967, 170 of some 240 persons arrested under
the ordinance were Negro." While "... 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were
Negroes."
"Cincinnati v. Coates, 21 Ohio St.2d 66, 255 N.E.2d 247 (1970), rev'd 402 U.S. 611
(1971).
2 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971).
2Id. at 614.
231d. at 615, 616. The court in its discussion of this anti-loitering statute stated that
such a prohibition ... contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against
those whose association together is 'annoying' because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their
physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens."
24Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
25Watts, smpra note 2, at 349, 352.
2'Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941).
' Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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certainty to give notice of the offense. 28 Statutes which fall short of
this necessary specificity are void for vagueness. It is difficult to
determine the actual standard of certainty required of criminal
statutes,2 but it is generally accepted that the language must pro-
vide notice of the prohibited conduct and mark distinct boundaries
for the enforcement of the law. 0 The nature of the offense,31 the
difficulty of definition, 2 the element of intent,n and other material
factors- are considered by the court in its determination of the
required certainty; but traditionally, it is the interaction of these
factors with the required notice to the reasonable man which de-
termines the necessary specificity of the language involved." The
courts will weigh the nature of the individual interest to be regu-
lated against the interest of the community in the regulation of this
conduct. 6 It is this weighing of interests which determines the
required certainty of statutory language, and the validity of an
exercise of police power.
Overbreadth concerns those statutes which, even though pos-
sibly describing the prohibited conduct with sufficient certainty, do
so in terms so broad that they encompass constitutionally protected
conduct.37 And while a vague statute is usually overbroad, an over-
broad statute need not be vague. The vagueness and overbreadth
principles are separate and distinct yet similar constitutional flaws,
often considered by the courts as one. Here we are concerned with
the overbreadth of disorderly conduct statutes, whether vague or
is Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957).
2 Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N.E.2d 140, 141 (1936). Here the Ohio Supreme Court,
although providing no standard, stated that a statute cannot be held invalid for uncertainty
if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language; mere difliculty in
ascertaining its meaning, or the single fact that it is susceptible of different interpretations
will not necessarily render it nugatory . . .
" United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 8, (1947). In this early vagueness decision the Court
found the "Constitution presents no ... insuperable obstacle to legislation." The fact that
a more certain definition of the regulated conduct could have been enacted will not render
a statute void.
1 Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
35 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
33United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
34Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). "The nature of a place, 'the
pattern of its normal activities, dictates the kinds of regulations of time, place and manner
that are reasonable,'" See aso, People v. Shifrin, 301 N.Y. 445, 94 N.E.2d 724 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1950) which finds the individual entitled to an unequaivocal warning before con-
duct "not malum in se" could be prohibited.
35 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
36 American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950). The Supreme
Court held that when first amendment freedoms are regulated in the interest of public
order "the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests de-
mands the greater protection under the circumstances presented."
T Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536 (1965). In this decision the Supreme Court held the
state construction of a statute to prohibit the orderly expression of an unpopular view
unconstitutional.
[Vol. 22:18G
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merely too general for the protection of the rights of the individual.'
Such statutes may prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, and
provide a basis for the inconsistent regulation of that conduct prop-
erly within the power of the city to regulate. A statute which pro-
vides no objective standard for enforcement, but is interpreted to
regulate only that conduct not constitutionally protected may provide
no guarantee against arbitrary or capricious action. In fact, it may
encourage such action.
In the protection of individual interests, the vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines have required a higher degree of certainty in the
definition of these offenses in the area of the first amendment free-
doms;39 and recent Supreme Court decisions have held anti-noise,"
loitering,41 vagrancy," and lewd or profane speech statutes43 to this
specificity requirement. It is generally recognized that prosecution
in this area "involves imponderables and contingencies that them-
selves may inhibit the full exercise of first amendment freedoms,"4
and the Supreme Court has been quick to protect these interests of
the individual.5 In fact, the Supreme Court has explained that
"[t]he objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not
depend upon absence of fair notice . . . but upon the danger of
tolerating, in the area of first amendment freedoms, the existence
of a penal statute capable of sweeping and improper application. " 46
And although it would seem that disorderly conduct may be dis-
tinguished as action rather than a first amendment freedom, the
courts will look to the effect of the statute as well as the conduct
which it is drawn to prohibit.47 Where a statute which regulates con-
duct infringes upon the rights of the individual, it is the duty of the
courts to determine which interest demands the greater protection. 41
It is only through this weighing of interests that a standard of
required specificity may be determined.
38 12 AM. JUR. 2d Breach of Peace, §38 (1964). 1 would disagree with the statement found
herein that "A statute that declares that any person who by offensive or disorderly acts or
language annoys or interferes with another person in any place is guilty of the misde-
meanor of disorderly conduct is not subject to the charge that it is so vague as to be
invalid for lack of objective standards."
3 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Scull v. Virginia, 379 U.S. 344 (1959).
40 Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
41 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
4 2 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
43 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
4Dombrowski v. Pfistes, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
45 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963), "First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."
4M.at 433 (1963).
4
'American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950). The court
stated that "regulation of 'conduct' has all too frequently been employed by public authority
as a cloak to hide censorship of unpopular ideas."
'Id.
19731
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The vagueness concept, once a common law requirement of
notice, has become a principle which centers on a "rough idea of
fairness," 49 and hinges on a reasonable weighing of all of the inter-
ests involved. 0 It requires no insurmountable standard of certainty
of the legislature in the definition of the conduct to be regulated.5'
And the fact that "marginal cases" exist where it is difficult to de-
termine whether the conduct in question is prohibited will not
render a statute invalid.52 Where, however, the conduct to be regu-
lated affects interests of the individual which outweigh the interest
of the community in the regulation of this conduct, the courts will
require a higher degree of certainty. 3
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court, moving beyond the
traditional requirement of notice to the offender, explained that
vague laws are offensive to "several important values."m
First, . . . we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited so that he may act accordingly ....
Second, . . . if arbitrary 4nd discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them.
Third, .. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to
steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the bound-
aries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. 55
The basis for the vagueness principle, at least in the areas which
abut on the first amendment freedoms, rests on these three values.
The courts must concentrate on each of these factors if our popula-
tion is to enjoy an unfettered freedom of expression.
Thus, for example, where a statute provides "A person is
guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public incon-
49 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
s
0 See e. g. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). A consideration of the inter-
ests involved in the enforcement of a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance led the court to com-
mcnt, the ordinance "makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally
innocent.
1 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7
(1947).
52 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
n Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Supreme Court stated that ... in
assessing the reasonableness of regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communica.
tion is involved, the regulation must bc narrowly tailored to further the state's legitimate
interest."
S4Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
55Id. at 108, 109.
[Vol. 22:186
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venience," the offender "refuses to comply with a lawful order of
the police to disperse,"56 and the required intent is defined by the
state court as the dominant intent, the statute will be upheld.57 It
is necessary that the order be a lawful order linked to the protect-
able interest of the community, and that the dominant intent of the
offender be contrary to this protectable interest. Where, however, a
statute prohibits "opprobrious and abusive words tending to cause
a breach of the peace," and this language is defined by the state
court as prohibiting something less than fighting words, the statute
will be found vague and overbroad."
Action may not be restricted because it is unpopular,59 but
reasonable regulation linked to community interests will be per-
mitted.60 This reasonable regulation must go to the form and effect
of the law.
Judicial Interpretation
The offense of disorderly conduct is statutory, and as such
subject to variations in scope and legislative provision in each juris-
diction." In Ohio there is no enforceable disorderly conduct statute,62
and while many sections of the Ohio Revised Code prohibit petty
offenses often considered disorderly conduct, 63 the offense is normally
covered by the city ordinance." The result is that both the form and
enforcement of disorderly conduct statutes vary throughout the state.S
Although the form of these statutes varies, when tested in the
state courts there seems to be one factor which favors each enact-
ment. The courts will "endeavor by every rule of construction to
ascertain the meaning of, and give full force and effect to, every
enactment . . . not obnoxious to constitutional prohibition.""
The effect of this determination of the courts to uphold each
enactment may best be illustrated by concentrating on one element
56 Colten v, Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
57 Id.
5 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
59 Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
60Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575, 576 (1940).
61 18 OHIO JUR. 2d, Disorderly Conduct, §1 (1972).
62 For a discussion of the existing Ohio law on disorderly conduct see, 18 OHIO Ju,. 2d,
Disorderly Conduct (1972); OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, PROPOSED OHIO
CRIMINAL CODE 186 (1971).
6"See e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 37 (Page 1953) which prohibits such offenses as:
§3773.03 throwing hard objects upon a street; §3773.07 fighting a duel; §3773.09 agreeing
to fight; §3773.22 being intoxicated and conducting oneself in a disorderly manner.
4HIO CONST §3, art. 18, authorizes municipalities to adopt such police regulations as are
not in conflict with the general laws of the state, and §§715.49, 715.55 of the Ohio Rev.
Code authorize certain specific municipal ordinances which protect against violations of the
peace and good order of the community.
65 18 OHIO JuR. 2d, Disorder Conduct, §1 (1972).
66Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N.E.2d 140, 141 (1936).
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often present in the statutory definition of disorderly conduct. That
is the element of intent.67 Intent, when required as one element of a
crime, has been recognized by the courts as a limiting factor of the
required specificity for a criminal statute." In the 1945 Screws de-
cision, the Supreme Court of the United States found the require-
ment of intent "may avoid those consequences which render a vague
or indefinite statute invalid."'" The prohibition of willful annoying
conduct, for example, may provide an element of notice, and guide-
lines for judicial interpretation, not provided by a statute which
prohibits merely annoying conduct.7 0 Since the early decisions which
determined this limiting factor of intent, the legislatures have
drafted, and the courts have interpreted, 2 many statutes to include
"willful" conduct which violates an interest of the community. In
the judicial interpretation of these statutes, state courts have gone
so far as to find the required intent a "dominant intent," thereby
precluding the possibility of a prohibition of constitutionally pro-
tected action.'
Such judicial interpretation of vague statutory language may
provide the minimum standard of certainty required of criminal
statutes. It requires a consideration of each factor which supports
the vagueness and overbreadth concepts, however. When viewed in
the light of the recent three-fold reasoning of the Grayned decision,
4
6t7See e.g. CLEVELAND, OHIO, PENAL CODE §13.1124 which prohibits participation in dis-
orderly activities:
If any person shall knowingly and willfully constitute or make himself a part
of any noisy, boisterous or disorderly assemblage of persons, countenancing
the same by his presence, which annoys the inhabitanats . . .
This ordinance was declared unconstitutional, however, in Cleveland v. Anderson, 13 Ohio
App.23 S3, 234 N..23 04 (1968) because the intent required for the offense was simply
the knowing presence of an individual at such a gathering. it required no criminal act of
the offender.
68 United States v. Roger, 314 U.S. 513 (1942); Corwin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27
(1940); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
69 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,101 (1944).
70 In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky statute
which prohibited "disorderly conduct with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance,
or alarm . .. [where the offenderi refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to
disperse." The Kentucky court had interpreted the required intent as a "dominant intent."
In Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), however, the Supreme Court struck down a
statute which prohibited merely "annoying" conduct. The word annoying alone will not
satisfy the specificity requirement.
71 CLEVELAND, OHIO PENAL CODE §13.1126 "If any person shall willfully conduLt himself
in a noisy, boisterous, rude, insulting, or other disorderly manner, by either words or acts,
toward any other person, with intent to abuse or annoy such person, or so as to annoy the
citizens of the city, or any portion thereof, or disturb the good order and quiet of the
same
72Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 285 N.E.2d 714 (1972). In this case the
Supreme Court of Ohio, citing Colte v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), upheld a Cin-
cinnati ordinance which required "'intent to cause ... annoyance" and the court interpreted
this intent as the "dominant intent" thereby prohibiting no constitutionally protected
conduct.
73Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
74Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
(Vol. 22.186
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and the emphasis of NAACP v. Button 5 (discussed in the vague-
ness section), it would seem that the requirement of a "dominant
intent" may mark boundaries for juries but provide no standard
for police enforcement. It can do little to insure against the improper
application of a vague penal statute. "A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoe basis, with the attendant dangers of arbi-
trary and discriminatory application."' The judicial limitation of
vague statutory language should eliminate this improper delegation
of authority at each level of enforcement. The courts must "endeavor
by every rule of construction to . . . give full force and effect to,
every enactment . . . not obnoxious to constitutional prohibition. '77
But this will require a consideration of each element obnoxious to
the constitution.
The vagueness concept, once a common law requirement of
notice, hinges on a reasonable weighing of all of those interests
involved.
The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code 70
A complete revision of the criminal law of Ohio is now before
75 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
76 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972).
77Eastman v, State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N.E.2d 140, 141 (1936).
7 A point beyond the scope of this Note but which merits concern is the form of those "riot
statutes" now being considered by the Ohio Legislature in the form of House Bill 511.
(The proposed revision of the Ohio Criminal Code.) This revision would change the
standard of conduct necessary for the offense of "riot" and "aggravated riot" from "violent
and tumultuous conduct" under given explosive conditions as now provided in Section
2923.52 and 2923.53 of the Ohio Revised Code, to "disorderly conduct" as defined in Sec-
tion 2917.11 of the pending revision (see this section within the text above). The net effect
of this change if approved would be to prohibit many actions not generally considered
riotous.
AGGRAVATED RIOT
Sec. 2917.02 (A) No person shall participate with four or more others in
a course of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917-11 of The Revised
Code:
(1) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony;
(2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any offense of
violence;
(3) When the offender or any participant to the knowledge of the offender has
on or about his person or under his control, uses, or intends to use a deadly
weapon or dangerous ordinance as defined in section 2923.11 of The Re-
vised Code.
(B) No person, being an inmate in a detention facility as
defined in section 2921.01 of The Revised Code, shall violate division (A) of
this section, or section 2917.03 of The Revised Code. ...
(Continued on next page)
(1954).
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the state legislature in the form of House Bill 511."1 The purpose of
the bill is to provide a compact and complete criminal code while
eliminating those sections of the Ohio Revised Code which have be-
come obsolete since its origin in 1788.0 Section 2917.11 of this pro-
posed revision would provide the following specific and enforceable
disorderly conduct statute.
Sec. 2917.11 (A) No person shall recklessly cause in-
convenience, annoyance, or alarm to another, by doing any
of the following:
(1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons
or property, or in violent or turbulent behavior;
(2) Making unreasonable noise or offensively course utter-
ance, gesture, or display, or communicating unwarranted
and grossly abusive language to any person;
(3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under cir-
cumstances in which such conduct is likely to provoke
a violent response;
(4) Creating a condition physically offensive to persons or
hazardous to persons or property, by any act which
serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.
(Continued from preceding page)
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Sec. 2917.03 (A) No person shall participate with four or more others in
a course of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917.11 of The Revised
Code:
(1) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a misdemeanor,
other than disorderly conduct;
(2) With purpose to intimidate a public official or employee into taking or
refraining from official action, or with purpose to hinder, impede, of
obstruct a function of government;
(3) With purpose to hinder, impede, or obstruct the orderly process of ad-
ministration or instruction at an educational institution, or to interfere
with or disrupt lawful activities carried on at such institution.
(B) No person shall participate with four or more others
with purpose to do an act with unlawful force or violence, even though such
act might otherwise be unlawful ...
There can be little doubt that the statutes in this form would be unconstitutionally
overbroad, e-g. the creation of a physically offensive condition" or the "making of an
offensively coarse gesture" by five students with the purpose of disrupting lawful activities
at an educational institution would constitute the offense of "riot." The same conduct com-
mitted by five inmates at a detention facility would constitute "aggravated riot" and could
be punished by two to ten years of imprisonment.
"AM. SuB. H.B. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly (March 31, 1971). The text of this
Bill, prior to introduction and House amendments, is available in Ohio Legislative Service
Commission, Proposed Ohio Criminal Code (1971). For the sake of convenience refer-
ences to sections of this Bill will be made to this publication.
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(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of disor-
derly conduct, a minor misdemeanor. If the offender persists
in disorderly conduct after reasonable request to desist, dis-
orderly conduct is a misdeameanor of the fourth degree.9
This section, while covering an area not covered by the present
criminal code, would provide a uniform disorderly conduct statute
for the state of Ohio. It contains objective standards for enforce-
ment and yet provides "flexibility for police officers" by introducing
a lesser offense with which to charge petty malefactors." 2 The adop-
tion of such a section could make a contribution to a uniform pro-
tection of the community.
Conclusion
It is the duty of the legislature to provide statutes which pro-
tect the peace and good order of the community as well as safeguard
the rights of the individual. And while no insurmountable burden
should be placed on the legislatures in the definition of that conduct
to be regulated, a delegation of those basic policy decisions necessary
to strike a balance between those interests in the community may
deny the essential due process guaranteed by the vagueness and
overbreadth concepts.
When the courts are presented with a vagueness question con-
cerning an archaic city or state statute, they should be eager to void,
rather than careful to interpret, the statute. It is the duty of the
courts to establish and insure the minimum standard of specificity
required of such statutes.
Charles M. Youngf
n Id. at 192.
82Id.
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